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The Education of Detroit’s Pension and Bond Creditors
Summary
Detroit filing for bankruptcy had significant implications for people beyond the residents of the city. There
were consequences for pension beneficiaries and bondholders that call into question the laws that protect
pension and bond creditors during municipality financial distress. The future of municipal governance actually
would be brighter if pensions and government obligation bonds can be restructured, at least a little, in
bankruptcy.
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Many of Detroit’s bond and pension hold-
ers thought they were nearly certain to 
be paid in full, even after Detroit filed for 
bankruptcy. But both are almost certainly 
mistaken. Bankruptcy judge Steven Rhodes 
explicitly stated in his recent ruling uphold-
ing Detroit’s eligibility to file for bankruptcy 
that the pensions can be restructured, and 
this ruling is likely to be upheld on appeal. 
The ruling did not directly address the status 
of Detroit’s general obligation bonds, but 
these creditors too are likely to be forced to 
accept considerably less than one hundred 
cents on the dollar. 
Why are both constituencies likely 
to receive so much less than they initially 
imagined?
One reason is simply that municipal 
bankruptcies are uncommon, and for major 
cities unprecedented. Even Rick Snyder, 
Michigan’s governor, proclaimed a bank-
ruptcy for Detroit unthinkable only three 
years ago. Because creditors did not expect 
even so financially distressed a city as Detroit 
to file for municipal bankruptcy, they paid 
less attention than they should have to the 
possible implications of a bankruptcy filing. 
But there is another, more significant 
reason for Detroit pension beneficiaries’ and 
creditors’ confusion as well. It isn’t just that 
bankruptcy is uncommon, and thus wasn’t on 
their radar screen. Both pensions and general 
obligation bonds have a radically different 
status, and much more protection, outside of 
bankruptcy than they do when a municipal-
ity files for bankruptcy.  Both constituencies 
seemed to assume that the protection was, 
like a diamond, forever. But both constituen-
cies were wrong. 
In this Issue Brief, I will describe the 
basis for pension beneficiaries’ and bond-
holders’ beliefs that they are fully protected, 
and explain why both are almost certainly 
mistaken about the efficacy of these protec-
The educaTion of deTroiT’s 
Pension and Bond crediTors
david skeel
The Detroit residents who must wait fifty-eight minutes for a 
response to their 911 calls and whose streetlights do not work are 
not the only ones who are dazed and confused. 
 
brief in brief
•	 The	example	of	Detroit	raises	the	question	
of	whether	state	lawmakers	should	look	
for	ways	 to	more	 fully	protect	pension	
beneficiaries	and	bondholders.	Several	
states	that	previously	did	not	have	special	
protections	in	place	have	recently	taken	
steps	in	this	direction.
•	 Although	these	protections	would	spare	
future	pension	beneficiaries	or	bondholders	
the	 fate	of	 their	compatriots	 in	Detroit,	
there	are	two	very	serious	problems	with	
them.
•	 First,	if	these	obligations—pensions	espe-
cially—cannot	be	restructured	under	any	
circumstances,	some	U.S.	municipali-
ties	will	be	incapable	of	addressing	their	
financial	distress.
•	 Moreover,	these	cities	may	be	forced	to	
cut	back	dramatically	on	services,	with	
substantial	consequences.
•	 The	future	of	municipal	governance	actu-
ally	would	be	brighter	 if	pensions	and	
government	 obligation	 bonds	 can	 be	
restructured,	at	least	a	little,	in	bankruptcy.
tions in bankruptcy. I then will describe 
recent efforts to protect pensions in Illinois 
and bonds in Rhode Island, and argue that 
extending these kinds of protections would 
be a mistake. Although the uncertainty about 
the pensions’ and bonds’ status is inconsis-
tent with basic rule of law expectations, it 
also is temporary; and permitting pensions 
and bonds to be restructured in bankruptcy 
would bring considerable benefits.
The Pension BomBshell
Last June, shortly before Detroit filed for 
bankruptcy, Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr 
filed a report that served as a rude awaken-
ing for many of Detroit’s creditors, includ-
ing its pension beneficiaries. Orr had been 
appointed at the end of March, pursuant to 
controversial state provisions that permit 
the governor to select an emergency man-
ager who would largely displace the mayor 
and city council if a city is in financial dis-
tress. Contrary to the trustees of Detroit’s 
two major pension funds, who claimed that 
the pensions were adequately funded, Orr’s 
report estimated that they were under-
funded by $3.5 billion. Even more radically, 
Orr also insisted that the pensions would 
need to be reduced, a step that pension 
beneficiaries insisted is impossible under 
Michigan law.1 
The key to the standoff between 
Detroit’s emergency manager and the pen-
sion beneficiaries is a provision that was 
added to Michigan’s state constitution in 
1963. This provision states that accrued 
pension benefits “shall not be diminished 
or impaired.”2 To pension beneficiaries, the 
provision sounds like a trump card assur-
ing that their pensions can’t be touched. 
Outside of bankruptcy, they may well be 
right.3 And properly funded pensions are 
probably protected even in bankruptcy. But 
if a city has failed to fully fund its pensions, 
the unfunded portion of the pension may be 
subject to restructuring in bankruptcy.
How can this conclusion be reconciled 
with the Michigan state constitution, with 
its very clear promise that pension benefits 
“shall not be diminished or impaired?” 
The simple answer is that federal law takes 
precedence over state law—even state 
constitutional law—under the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.4 Because 
the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress 
to enact bankruptcy laws, and the municipal 
bankruptcy law that Congress has enacted 
permits a city to restructure its ordinary 
debts, the unfunded portion of a pension 
can be restructured even if state law seems 
to say pensions are sacrosanct.
Bankruptcy’s overriding of the Michi-
gan constitution may seem problematic at 
first glance, but it makes a great deal more 
sense once we add two key details. The 
first is that it is an exaggeration to say, as 
I have just done, that bankruptcy over-
rides Michigan’s constitution. Michigan’s 
prohibition against impairing pensions 
was not added with bankruptcy in mind 
at all. Prior to 1963, a pension promise 
was simply a “gratuity” in Michigan, as 
in many other states. A city like Detroit 
could withdraw the promise at any time, 
even after a school teacher or fireman had 
worked for the city for decades and was 
about to retire. Michigan lawmakers wanted 
to put pension promises on sounder footing, 
by making them enforceable contractual 
obligations. This does not mean that the 
obligation could never be restructured, even 
in bankruptcy; it means that a city like 
Detroit cannot simply decide to withdraw 
its promise. Michigan lawmakers could have 
gone further, and forbidden even the most 
financially distressed city from filing for 
bankruptcy if they had wished to do so. Cit-
ies can only file for bankruptcy if their state 
consents to municipal bankruptcy filings. 
This gave Michigan the power to just say 
no. But Michigan has permitted cities to file 
for bankruptcy since 1939, shortly after the 
first permanent municipal bankruptcy law 
was enacted. Indeed, not only did Michi-
gan authorize municipal bankruptcy, but 
Michigan lawmakers such as Frank Murphy, 
the mayor of Detroit and later governor and 
then a U.S. Supreme Court justice, were 
among the most vigorous advocates for 
municipal bankruptcy in the 1930s.
The second key fact is that the Detroit 
pensions are likely to be protected to the 
extent they are adequately funded. The funds 
that Detroit and its employees contributed 
to its two major pension funds belong to the 
beneficiaries. A court is likely to conclude 
that Detroit and Detroit’s other credi-
tors do not have any interest in the funds. 
Notice the implication of this: if Detroit 
had properly funded its pensions, the pen-
sion beneficiaries would not have anything 
to worry about. In fact, the same Michigan 
constitutional provision that prohibits 
the impairment of pensions requires that 
the pensions be fully funded each year as 
they accrue. Detroit seems to have simply 
ignored this constitutional obligation.
I should point out that my comments 
about the status of the Detroit pensions are 
somewhat speculative. Prior to the recent 
decision by Detroit’s bankruptcy judge 
holding that Detroit is eligible to file for 
bankruptcy, no judge had directly ruled on 
the question of whether a pension can be 
restructured in bankruptcy. Judge Steven 
Rhodes ruled that pensions can indeed 
be restructured, and seemed to suggest 
that even the funded portion may not be 
protected.5 I suspect that he will not go this 
far if and when Detroit does in fact propose 
a restructuring. But he has made clear that 
pensions are not immune from restructuring 
in bankruptcy.
The importance of this conclusion can-
not be overstated. The Detroit decision is 
currently on appeal, and it could quite easily 
make its way to the Supreme Court.  If the 
conclusion that pensions can be restructured 
is upheld, other major cities may think 
seriously about the bankruptcy option. 
Chicago, Philadelphia and other cities face 
severe structural deficits, and in each case 
by far the most serious problem is poten-
 1 I	discuss	many	of	the	issues	in	this	section	more	fully	in	
a	white	paper	prepared	a	 few	weeks	before	the	Detroit	
bankruptcy	 judge’s	ruling	recent	eligibility	 ruling.	 	David	
Skeel,	Can	Pensions	be	Restructured	 in	 (Detroit’s)	Mu-
nicipal	Bankruptcy,	available	at	http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360302.
 2 MICH.	Const.	ART.	XXIV,	sec.	9.
 3 Indeed,	shortly	after	Detroit	filed	for	bankruptcy,	Detroit’s	
unions	persuaded	a	Michigan	state	court	judge	to	issue	
injunctions	designed	to	prevent	Michigan	state	officials	
from	pursuing	a	bankruptcy	case.		The	bankruptcy	judge	
held	that	the	state	court	orders	were	unavailing,	however,	
because	state	court	actions	are	halted	by	the	filing	of	a	
bankruptcy	case.		
 4 The	Supremacy	Clause	states	that	the	“Constitution,	and	
the	Laws	of	the	United	States	.	.	.	shall	be	the	supreme	
Law	of	the	Land.”	U.S.	Const,	Art.	VI,	sec.	2.
 5 See	In	re	City	of	Detroit,	Michigan,	Case	No.	13-53846,	
Opinion	Regarding	Eligibility,	at	80	(Bankr.	E.D.	Mich.	Dec	
5,	2013)(noting	that	the	Michigan	legislature	could	have	
created	a	property	 interest,	 security	 interest,	or	state	
guarantee	when	lawmakers	added	pension	protection	to	
the	Michigan	constitution	in	1963,	but	did	not).
 6 The	legislation	was	codified	as	part	of	the	1988	amend-
ments	to	the	bankruptcy	laws.		Public	Law	No.	100-597	
(1988).
 7 See,	e.g,	Christian	S.	Herzeca,	Detroit	Chapter	9	Pension	
Impairment	and	Special	Revenues	Pledged	 to	Secure	
tially unsustainable pension obligations. 
If pensions can be restructured, municipal 
bankruptcy may be a solution for an egre-
giously stressed city. If pensions cannot be 
restructured, municipal bankruptcy will offer 
little relief, and we are not likely to see any 
additional bankruptcy filings by major cities. 
General oBliGaTion 
Bonds: The meaninG of 
full faiTh and crediT
Detroit’s general obligation (GO) bond-
holders are in an oddly analogous predica-
ment. They too seem to have assumed that 
repayment was assured, and that their 
apparently fortified status would be recog-
nized in bankruptcy. Like Detroit’s pension 
beneficiaries, its bond holders are almost 
certainly mistaken.
Why were the holders of GO bonds so 
sure they were fully protected? Part of the 
answer has nothing to do with the bond-
holders’ legal status, and everything to do 
with the municipal bond market’s assump-
tion that a major city would never file for 
bankruptcy, as I mentioned earlier. But the 
main reason for GO bondholders’ optimism 
about their status is that they are different 
than general creditors in several important 
respects. Unlike with other debt, such as 
the certificates of participation issued when 
Detroit issued debt to fund its pensions, 
the GO bonds were explicitly approved by 
Detroit’s voters. In addition to authorizing 
the borrowing, the voters pledged that the 
GO debt would be backed by Detroit’s “full 
faith and credit.” Shortly before and after 
Detroit’s bankruptcy filing, I had conversa-
tions with bond market participants who 
assured me that the full faith and credit 
provision gave GO bonds more protection 
than other debt, such as revenue bonds 
that are secured by water, sewer or casino 
revenues. Unlike revenue bonds, which have 
only a limited source of funding, the reason-
ing went, GO bonds are backed by all of 
Detroit’s revenues.
Although there is a certain logic to 
these assumptions, the belief that GO bonds 
are protected and revenue bonds are vulner-
able is upside-down from a bankruptcy 
perspective: in bankruptcy, revenue bonds 
are protected and GO bonds aren’t.  With 
revenue bonds, the bankruptcy laws treat the 
specified revenue source as truly belonging 
to the bondholders, and as securing their 
repayment. Unlike most other creditors, 
revenue bondholders are explicitly permit-
ted to continue collecting the payments 
even during the bankruptcy case, thanks 
to a 1988 reform that sought to make sure 
that bankruptcy does not interfere with the 
payment of revenue bonds.6 GO bonds are 
not entitled to any such protection. The “full 
faith and credit” protection is not treated 
as giving GO bondholders a right to any 
particular source of revenue. They are simply 
general creditors, and Detroit’s obligations 
to them can be restructured just as its obli-
gations to other creditors can be.
Not surprisingly, GO bondholders have 
crafted arguments that they too are entitled 
to protection. A number of Detroit’s GO 
bonds have contractual provisions say-
ing that the bonds are entitled to payment 
from all funds legally available to the City, 
including ad valorem property taxes. Insur-
ers of some of these bonds are now arguing 
that their bonds are actually revenue bonds, 
and that they are entitled to all the protec-
tions of revenue bonds.7 The insurers have 
now filed a motion in the bankruptcy case 
asking the judge to set aside Detroit’s ad 
valorem taxes for the benefit of the bonds.
Notice that this argument does not 
claim that GO bonds are entitled to special 
treatment; rather, the insurers are arguing 
that the bonds actually are revenue bonds, 
not GO bonds. Although the argument is 
plausible, at least for the bonds involved in 
the suit, the bonds are rather different than 
ordinary revenue bonds. They are linked 
to particular revenues only in the sense 
that Detroit was required to increase its 
ad valorem taxes if it did not have enough 
funds for payment. Not until bankruptcy 
was imminent did the bond insurers sud-
denly ask for revenues to be segregated on 
their behalf. They seem to have hoped that if 
they started acting like holders of a revenue 
bond, the court might treat them as such. 
But it seems more likely that the bankruptcy 
court will treat even these GO bondholders 
and insurers as general creditors. 
Although Detroit’s bondholders and 
pension beneficiaries have mixed their legal 
arguments with a heavy dose of posturing, 
both constituencies seem to have genuinely 
believed that the law was on their side, and 
that they would be protected even if Detroit 
filed for bankruptcy. This is the worst 
possible kind of misunderstanding While, 
theoretically, it could have been beneficial 
for creditors to believe that they have less 
protection than they actually have,8 it is 
hard to imagine anything good coming of 
their exaggerated belief in their own protec-
tion. Certainly policymakers did not have 
any incentive to signal to bondholders or 
pension beneficiaries that their status was 
more precarious than they thought.
should sTaTes enacT 
sPecial ProTecTions?
While virtually all large-scale state and 
local pensions are significantly underfunded, 
the magnitude of the funding gap varies 
substantially across geographic areas. In 
Figure 1, for example, I display the annual 
contribution necessary per household per 
General	Obligation	Bonds,	MBS/MONOLINE	LITIGA-
TION	COMMENTARY	FOR	SPECULATORS,	available	
at	 	http://mbibaclitigtion.blogspot.com/2013/12/detroit-
chapter-9-pension-impairment.html	 (“T]he	 insured	GOs	
are	paid	 from	 the	 levy	of	ad	valorem	 taxes	 levied	by	
Detroit	 in	connection	with	 the	 issuance	of	 the	 insured	
GOs.	 	…	“[As	with]	 revenue	bonds,	 these	 tax	 receipts	
were	specifically	pledged	to	 repay	 the	 insured	GOs	 ...	
and	no	authority	was	granted	to	apply	these	tax	receipts	
other	than	towards	the	repayment	of	the	insured	GOs”).
 8 I	say	“theoretically”	because	 I	have	my	doubts.	Prior	 to	
the	recent	crisis,	some	commentators	argued	that	“con-
structive	ambiguity”	can	be	beneficial—even	desirable—	
in	some	contexts.		But	the	behavior	of	Lehman	Brothers	
and	AIG	during	their	downward	spirals	cast	considerable	
doubt	on	the	thesis.
 9 Efforts	 recently	have	been	made	 to	 raise	hundreds	of	
millions	of	dollars	 to	protect	Detroit’s	pensions	and	art,	
but	even	these	funds	will	not	ensure	full	payment	of	the	
pensions.
 10 R.I.	GEN.	 LAWS	§	45-12-1(a)	 (2011)	 (“[A]ll	 general	
obligation	bonds	.	.	.	shall	constitute	a	first	lien	on	.	.	.	ad	
valorem	taxes	and	general	fund	revenues.”)		A	number	of	
other	states	also	purport	to	protect	bondholders	in	vari-
ous	ways,	but	Michigan	is	one	of	the	states	that	does	not.
 11 The	most	 recent	 revision	of	 the	Uniform	Commercial	
Code,	which	 every	 state	 has	 adopted,	 significantly	
expanded	 the	kinds	of	property	 that	can	be	used	as	
“If the decision that Detroit’s 
pensions can be restructured is 
upheld on appeal, other major 
cities may think seriously 
about the bankruptcy option.”
collateral.		Interestingly,	however,	“supergeneric”	descrip-
tions	of	 the	collateral,	such	as	“all	 the	debtor’s	assets”	
are	deemed	to	be	too	broad	to	qualify	as	creating	a	lien.	
U.C.C.	section	9-108(c).		
 12 See,	for	example,	Stephen	D.	Eide,	Quantifying	Crowd-
Out,	CIVIC	REPORT,	No.	81	(Oct.	2013).
 13 11	U.S.C.	sec.	901(a)(incorporating	1129(b)(1),	which	
prohibits	“unfair	discrimination”).
year over a 30-year period to bring state and 
local (e.g. Detroit or Los Angeles) pensions 
into balance. At the high end are states like 
New York, Ohio, and California. Interest-
ingly, Michigan is in the middle category.
Given the magnitude of the problem 
and the likelihood that pensions and bonds 
will be restructured in the Detroit bank-
ruptcy,9 state lawmakers may look for ways 
to more fully protect pension beneficiaries 
or bondholders. Several states that previ-
ously did not have special protections in 
place have recently taken steps in this direc-
tion and there is every reason to believe that 
others will think seriously about following 
their lead.
The most important recent state actions 
thus far have taken place in Rhode Island 
and Illinois. Two years before Detroit filed 
for bankruptcy, the Rhode Island legisla-
ture enacted a new law purporting to give 
general obligation bondholders a lien on all 
ad valorem tax and general fund revenues,10 
Thus, Rhode Island has created as a matter 
of formal state law the same kind of protec-
tion some of Detroit’s bondholders claim 
their bond contract gives them. The new law 
was enacted shortly before Central Falls, 
Rhode Island filed for bankruptcy, and was 
used to ensure that bondholders were paid 
in full. 
The first question to ask about this 
provision is whether it is enforceable in 
bankruptcy. From a legal perspective, there 
are several potential issues. First, although 
genuine liens are honored in bankruptcy, 
liens that apply only in bankruptcy or are 
not legitimate liens are not enforceable. 
The Rhode Island law is not limited to 
bankruptcy but it is debatable whether it 
creates a genuine lien. Ordinary liens apply 
to particular assets, such as a type of revenue 
or property. A lien on “all revenues” doesn’t 
have this quality. Given that state law now 
permits a creditor to obtain a lien on nearly 
any and everything,11 the Rhode Island 
law might be upheld. But is a very unusual 
“lien,” to say the least.
There is at least one other potential 
issue with the Rhode Island law. Under the 
Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
states are not permitted to impair existing 
contracts. By giving bondholders special 
protection, it is possible (though far from 
certain) that the Rhode Island law imper-
missibly impaired the contracts of other 
creditors of Central Falls and other Rhode 
Island cities, since protecting bondhold-
ers made it less likely these other creditors 
would be paid.  
To my knowledge, no state has pur-
ported to create a similar protection for pen-
sions, but Illinois may recently have achieved 
a very similar effect. In early December, 
Illinois passed legislation designed to reform 
its future pension obligations. The legislation 
includes provisions authorizing the state’s 
pensions to sue the state if their pensions 
are not adequately funded, and waving the 
state’s sovereign immunity for the purposes 
of the litigation. If Michigan had a provision 
like this, Detroit’s pensions would have the 
right to insist on payment from the state, 
even if Detroit restructured its pensions in 
bankruptcy.
A simpler way to protect pensions or 
bonds would be for the state to prohibit 
its municipalities from filing for bank-
ruptcy altogether. If the state does not 
permit its cities to file for bankruptcy, the 
status of pension or bond obligations will 
be subject solely to state law. At least one 
state—Georgia—has explicitly forbidden its 
municipalities from making use of municipal 
bankruptcy. Prohibiting municipal bank-
ruptcy would remove all of the benefits of 
bankruptcy, and thus might be seen as too 
draconian a corrective. The state also could 
change its mind, and remove the prohibi-
tion, more easily than it could withdraw a 
pension or bond specific protection. But tak-
ing bankruptcy off the table is another way 
to beef up protection for pensions or bonds.
Although these protections would spare 
future pension beneficiaries or bondholders 
the fate of their compatriots in Detroit, I 
fiGure 1:  reQuired increases for full Pension fundinG in 30 Years (Per residenT 
household, Per Year, no PolicY chanGe)
Source: R. Novy-Marx and J. Rauh (2012), “The Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises,”  
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18489.pdf, p. 48 
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believe there are two very serious problems 
with them. First and most important, if 
these obligations—pensions especially—
cannot be restructured under any circum-
stances, some municipalities will be inca-
pable of addressing their financial distress. 
Cities can limit their pension promises 
to future employees and in some cases 
adjust their obligations for not-yet-accrued 
benefits to current employees. They also 
can cut salaries or even lay off employees to 
reduce expenses. But for cities like Detroit 
that have unsustainable accrued obligations 
to retirees and current employees, none of 
these measures is sufficient.
Second, protecting one group of credi-
tors will inevitably inflict pain on other con-
stituencies. If a city is unable to restructure 
large portions of its obligations, it may be 
forced to cut back dramatically on services 
or may be unable to hire new teachers or 
police officers. The consequences may be 
considerable, and for many constituencies 
may be far more severe than if restructuring 
were possible. Although I am not aware of 
empirical evidence on the cost of linger-
ing financial distress outside of bankruptcy, 
commentators have speculated that they 
may be substantial.12
Odd as this may sound, doing nothing 
is likely to be far better than stepping in to 
protect a particular group of creditors. One 
of the chief benefits of bankruptcy is that it 
distributes the sacrifice of financial distress 
more broadly and equitably than is the case 
if a city is left to its own devices. Municipal 
bankruptcy prohibits “unfair discrimina-
tion” against any group of general creditors, 
which ensures that each group will receive 
roughly comparable treatment.13 
A second benefit of bankruptcy is that 
it may alter some of the perverse political 
incentives that have contributed to many 
cities’ financial distress. This is especially 
true with pensions. Although there are a 
variety of reasons for the current pension 
crisis, one of the biggest problems in many 
cities has been the absence of genuine bar-
gaining over the terms of pension promises. 
Public employees obviously would prefer a 
giant pension to a modest one, but so too 
would the politicians who ostensibly bar-
gain with them. In some cases, politicians 
are part of the same pension system; and 
even if they aren’t, they often depend on the 
votes of employees who are. If an unsustain-
ably generous pension can be restructured in 
bankruptcy, this gives employees much more 
of an interest in making sure that the pen-
sion promises are realistic, and that pensions 
are properly funded. 
With GO bonds, the principal objec-
tion to bankruptcy is the risk of contagion. 
If bonds can be restructured, the reason-
ing goes, a bankruptcy filing by one city 
will have devastating effects throughout 
the municipal bond market. The Detroit 
bankruptcy suggests that contagion may 
be an issue in the short run for cities in 
the same state, but it is unlikely to extend 
beyond the state borders. After Detroit 
filed, other Michigan municipalities faced 
a more unforgiving bond market, but there 
was very little impact outside of Michi-
gan. This is as one would expect. Detroit’s 
bankruptcy filing confirmed that the current 
Michigan administration is reluctant to bail 
out troubled Michigan cities, information 
that has relevance throughout Michigan. 
But it is much less relevant beyond Michi-
gan’s borders. And even within Michigan, 
the largest effects were very short term, 
with several municipalities delaying bond 
offerings or accepting larger than expected 
interest costs. 
Reporters often speculate about 
whether a ruling or a case will “set a prec-
edent” for future cases. Make no mistake: 
Judge Rhodes’ holding that Detroit’s pen-
sions can be restructured, and the likelihood 
that both pensions and general obligation 
bonds can be adjusted in the Detroit bank-
ruptcy, are hugely important developments 
that are being closely watched by struggling 
municipalities throughout the country. 
There will be a strong temptation for these 
constituencies to seek bankruptcy-proof 
protection from their state governments. 
This would be unfortunate. The future of 
municipal governance would be brighter if 
both sets of obligations can be restructured, 
at least a little, in bankruptcy.
Founded in 1881 as the first collegiate business school, the Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania is recognized globally for intellectual leadership and ongoing 
innovation across every major discipline of business education. With a broad global 
community and one of the most published business school faculties, Wharton creates 
economic and social value around the world. 
aBouT The Penn WharTon PuBlic 
PolicY iniTiaTive
The Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative 
(PPI) is a hub for research and educa-
tion, engaging faculty and students across 
University of Pennsylvania and reaching 
government decision-makers through inde-
pendent, practical, timely, and nonpartisan 
policy briefs. With offices both at Penn and 
in Washington, DC, the initiative provides 
comprehensive research, coverage, and 
analysis, anticipating key policy issues on 
the horizon. Penn  
Wharton PPI is led by Faculty Director 
Mark Duggan, the Rowan Family Foun-
dation Professor and Chair of Business 
Economics and Public Policy, and Professor 
of Health Care Management at Wharton.
aBouT Penn WharTon PPi issue 
Briefs
Penn Wharton PPI publishes issue briefs 
at least once a month, tackling issues that 
are varied but share one common thread: 
they are central to the economic health of 
the nation and the American people. These 
Issue Briefs are nonpartisan, knowledge-
driven documents written by Wharton 
and Penn faculty in their specific areas of 
expertise.
For additional copies, please visit  
the Penn Wharton PPI website at  
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu.
Follow us on Twitter: 
@PennWharton PPI
Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
aBouT The auThor
David Arthur Skeel, JD
Professor of Corporate Law, Penn Law School
David	Skeel	is	the	S.	Samuel	Arsht	Professor	of	
Corporate	Law	at	the	University	of	Pennsylvania	
School	of	Law.	He	is	the	author	of	The New Finan-
cial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act	and	Its	
(Unintended)	Consequences	(Wiley,	2011),	Icarus in 
the Boardroom	(Oxford,	2005)	and	Debt’s Dominion: 
A History of Bankruptcy Law in America	(Princeton,	
2001),	as	well	as	numerous	articles	and	other	
publications.	He	has	been	interviewed	on	The	News	
Hour,	Nightline,	Chris	Matthews’	Hardball	(MSNBC),	
National	Public	Radio,	and	Marketplace,	among	
others,	and	has	been	quoted	in	the	New York Times, 
Wall Street Journal, Washington Post	and	other	
newspapers	and	magazines.	Skeel	has	received	
the	Harvey	Levin	award	three	times	for	outstanding	
teaching,	as	selected	by	a	vote	of	the	graduating	
class,	the	Robert	A.	Gorman	award	for	excellence	
in	upper	level	course	teaching,	and	the	University’s	
Lindback	Award	for	distinguished	teaching.	
